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Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law2 is a 
tour de force. It demands reading and reflection. Its launching point is that we have entered a 
postnational world of law in which national and international law are no longer two separate 
realms grounded on the sovereignty of the nation state. Its primary foil is the turn to rethinking 
the international legal order in constitutionalist terms. Its contrasting normative vision is a 
pluralist one in which there is no legal center or hierarchy, but rather distinct legal orders that 
overlap and interact, sometimes accommodating and sometimes contesting each other, 
sometimes converging and sometimes diverging, in light of different competing and conflicting 
values, preferences, and priorities, though always pressed (and for Krisch rightly pressed) to take 
each other into account. The book nonetheless has much in common with its primary 
constitutionalist foil, reflected, quite provocatively, in a key term in its subtitle—Postnational 
Law. The nation state, for Krisch, a German law scholar who has established himself as one to be 
heard, is no longer the anchor, no longer the center which only relinquishes a bit of its ultimate 
authority for its own benefit pursuant to its consent to “international law,” the law between 
nation states. Rather, in the pluralist vision, the nation-state itself shares ultimate authority with 
multiple regional and international legal orders with which it interacts without a common 
normative framework—hence a postnational law within a pluralist structure. This vision, 
although less ambitious than the constitutional program it critiques, is nonetheless quite radical, 
and it shares more with many constitutionalist visions than it acknowledges, much more in fact 
than the conventional vision of national legal systems and their relation to international law. Let 
us first examine the book’s contributions before, in the spirit of pluralism, turning to its critique. 
 
1. The Book and its Contributions 
 
A. Alternative Structures: Pluralism vs. Constitutionalism 
The book is in three parts. Part I situates the book’s inquiry in a “postnational” context 
and discusses alternative legal responses to this context. In chapter 1, Krisch contends that the 
traditional conceptual distinction between national and international law no longer provides 
either an accurate empirical picture of the world as it is, or a normative one as to how it should 
be governed through law, since national decisionmaking increasingly has externalities on 
outsiders and is insufficient to advance national goals. As a result, Krisch argues, different layers 
of national and international law have become increasingly interwoven so that they can no longer 
be clearly distinguished. Krisch thus contends that we need a new or revised structural frame for 
understanding and reimagining legal ordering in this postnational context. He contrasts three 
structural responses, that of containment through reinvigorating oversight by national political 
and constitutional processes; that of transfer through adapting domestic concepts such as 
                                                
1 Melvin C. Steen Professor of Law, and Affiliated Professor in the Department of Political Science, University of 
Minnesota. 
2 Nico Krisch, Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law (2010). 
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constitutionalism and democracy to the regional and global levels; and that of break through 
“eschew[ing] constitutionalism’s emphasis on law and hierarchy” for “more pluralist models, 
which would leave greater space for politics in the heterarchical interplay of orders” (14-17). The 
book advocates the latter approach—a break—in contrast to a global constitutional one based on 
a common normative framework and clear allocations of authority. 
Chapter 2 introduces and critiques the constitutionalist response to the postnational 
context, before Chapter 3 sets forth the alternative of a pluralist response, and advances 
arguments for its superiority. Krisch acknowledges the diversity of visions for the constitutional 
program, including those informed by a pluralist perspective, such as those of Neil Walker, 
Mattias Kumm, and Miguel Poiares Maduro, but ultimately finds them misleading because 
inherent in a constitutional vision is hierarchy, a hierarchy that constitutes the order in which a 
people inhabit and interact (235).3 He adds the modifier “foundational” to clarify what he means 
by constitutionalism, a “foundational constitutionalism” which grounds “the entire system of 
government” and is constituted by a people, or demos (41-42).4 Foundational constitutionalism 
was born out of Enlightenment rationalist thought and “the revolutionary projects of the late 
eighteenth century,” symbolizing “a new order” (47) based on the interplay of human rights and 
popular sovereignty within a principled, reasoned common framework. In Krisch’s view, it is not 
suited to “the radical diversity that marks the global populace” (68). 
In chapter 3, Krisch makes his initial case for pluralism where there is no hierarchy, but 
ongoing contestation and normative exchange in which ultimate principles are left open. The 
pluralist process, he contends, can lead incrementally to normative convergence based on mutual 
accommodation, but it does not necessarily do so, since different polities operate within different 
legal orders having different normative orientations. In this chapter, he distinguishes what he 
calls “systemic pluralism,” in which there is no common normative framework, from 
“institutional pluralism,” in which plural legal orders interact within a common framework. He 
maintains that “institutional pluralism” is pluralism lite, and overlaps with variants of global 
constitutionalist thinking (77). He then explores the normative appeal of “systemic pluralism” in 
which different layers of law are enmeshed in a postnational world, and yet interact without a 
common framework. Krisch maintains that systemic pluralism is appealing, despite the lack of a 
stable transnational rule of law, because it allows for contestation and resistance to hegemony in 
a world of diverse values and perspectives, facilitates flexible adaptation to a world characterized 
by uncertainty and rapid change, and provides for checks and balances between different 
normative orders. He finds that such a systemic pluralist structure not only accounts better for 
                                                
3 As Jeffrey Dunoff and Joel Trachtman likewise write, “constitutionalization can respond [to fragmentation of 
international law] by providing centralized institutions or by specifying hierarchy among rules or adjudicators.” 
Dunoff & Trachtman, ‘A Functional Approach to International Constitutionalization’, in J. Dunoff & J. P. 
Trachtman (eds.) Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance (2009) 3, at 8. 
4 Krisch distinguishes “foundational constitutionalism” form “power-limiting constitutionalism,” which he finds 
“fail[s] to connect with the more radical promise connected with it [constitutionalism] historically.” Krisch, supra 
note , at 298. The vision of a functional power-limiting constitutionalism is put forward by Dunoff & Trachtman. 
Dunoff & Trachtman, supra note X, at 19-21 (the first two functions listed being allocating governance authority 
horizontally and vertically). For a foundational sense of the term, see also Walker, ‘Reframing EU 
Constitutionalism’, in J. Dunoff & J. P. Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law 
and Global Governance (2009) 149 at 151 (“Whether in the natural or the political world, the term constitution 
necessarily implied, and implies, the existence of a discrete and self-contained entity—a polity or political 
community—as the object of constitutional reference”); and Sweet, ‘Constitutional Courts’, in Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Constitutional Law (forthcoming publication) (“the ultimate measure of legitimacy for any CC 
[Constitutional Court] may well be its success at helping the polity construct a new ‘constitutional identity’”). 
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current social practice, but is normatively preferable. From a normative perspective, it best 
balances the inevitable tensions between the norms of inclusiveness, on the one hand, and self-
determination by groups, on the other.  
 
B. Three Case Studies of Postnational Pluralism  
Part II of the book presents three case studies that illustrate how postnational legal 
pluralism operates, covering human rights, security, and regulatory politics. The first case study, 
comprising chapter 4, concerns the development of the European human rights regime enshrined 
in the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) created pursuant to it, under which individuals now have direct rights of access to bring 
claims pursuant to Protocol 11. Individuals have brought over 642,655 individual claims before 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), resulting in more than 12,000 judgments,5 with 
over 91% of these claims being brought since 1998.6 Krisch maintains that, despite high rates of 
state compliance with rulings of the ECtHR, with many national courts regularly citing ECHtR 
jurisprudence, compliance is not automatic, but contingent. He notes that “21 out of 32 
responding European constitutional courts declared themselves not bound by ECtHR rulings” 
(127). For example, national courts resisted rulings by the ECtHR on the role of advocates-
general in proceedings, but following this national resistance, the ECtHR softened its 
requirements, accommodating national concerns (140). Krisch further addresses the pluralist 
interaction of different institutions at the European level, those of the ECtHR and the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ). The ECJ and ECtHR are formally in separate legal systems, but have 
engaged in implicit dialogue with each other. The ECJ has not accepted the rulings of the ECtHR 
as binding, but found them to be “a source of inspiration,” and cites them as authoritative in its 
own jurisprudence (133), leading to gradual convergence over time (129). The postnational 
European legal order for human rights thus involves not only through vertical interaction among 
national courts and the ECtHR, but also horizontal interaction among supranational European 
courts in a pluralist legal structure.  
The second case study, comprising chapter 5, concerns the adoption by the UN Security 
Council (UNSC) of a legislative role in response to the September 11 terrorist attacks. Under 
Article 103 of the UN Charter, the Charter is hierarchically superior to all other international 
treaties so that its provisions prevail in the event of a conflict with another treaty provision. 
Under Article 25 of the Charter, all UN members “agree to accept and carry out the decisions” of 
the UNSC. By its terms, the UN Charter can thus be seen in hierarchical terms, befitting a 
constitutional order. In the post-Soviet world after the Berlin Wall’s fall in 1989, the UNSC has 
become considerably more active, in some ways more closely approximating the initial vision for 
it. Its sanctions regimes today bear little resemblance to classical international law, since the 
rules are passed by a majority vote of a 15-member body, as opposed to agreement by states, are 
increasingly precise and administrative in character, and directly affect individuals (156). Yet, 
Krisch deftly shows how ECJ and state resistance to the UNSC’s assertions of authority over 
                                                
5 European Court of Human Rights, 50 Years of Activity: The European Court of Human Rights – Some Facts and 
Figures (2010), at 3, 12, 13 http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/ACD46A0F-615A-48B9-89D6-8480AFCC29FD/ 
0/FactsAndFigures_EN.pdf (stating that as of Jan. 1, 2010, 389,197 applications had been allocated to a decision 
body and 253,458 applications had been declared inadmissible). 
6 European Court of Human Rights, The European Court of Human Rights in Facts and Figures 2011 (2012), at 8 
http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/C99DDB86-EB23-4E12-BCDA-D19B63A935AD/0/ 
FAITS_CHIFFRES_EN_JAN2012_VERSION_WEB.pdf. Approximately 119,300 of these applications were 
pending as of 1 January 2012. Ibid., at 5. 
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terrorist financing led to progressive change in UNSC practice regarding the due process and 
procedural concerns of those placed on counter-terrorism lists, which result in the freezing of 
their assets. He examines the ECJ ruling in the Kadi case, where the court held that the 
provisions of international law in question could not derogate from EU principles of liberty and 
respect for human rights (169). He notes, in parallel, judgments of other states challenging the 
adequacy of UNSC procedures, such as the United Kingdom, Canada, Turkey and Pakistan (159, 
186), collectively creating normative pressures on the UNSC to change its practices in order to 
forestall further litigation, assure compliance with its decisions, and uphold its authority. The 
Security Council has, in response, delisted a number of individuals, and revised its procedures 
multiple times. In December 2009, the UNSC created the position of an Ombudsman empowered 
to receive and raise delisting requests (159).7  
The third case study, comprising chapter 6, turns from human rights and international 
security to regulation—that of genetically modified (GM) foods, an issue on which I have co-
written a book from which Krisch draws and which he, in part, critiques.8 The focus of our book, 
When Cooperation Fails, was on two powerful jurisdictions—that of the United States and 
European Union—who adopted radically different approaches to the regulation of GM foods and 
tried to use transnational networks and international institutions as leverage to advance their 
positions globally. The book notes the distributive consequences (material, political, and social) 
of either side compromising, and concludes that this area of law illustrates where international 
cooperation through international networks and international organizations confronts severe 
limits, and thus can be viewed as failing. Because the US and EU disagreed on GM regulation, 
other countries had somewhat more freedom to choose among regulatory alternatives, but at the 
same time were placed in difficult straits. Argentine farmers, for example, adopted GM soy, but 
Argentina passed a law that no GM seeds could be planted until they were approved in the EU, 
in order to assure that those which had been approved would not be denied entry to the EU 
because they were inadvertently mixed with minute quantities of a variety that the EU had not 
approved.  
Krisch casts this story in terms of horizontal and vertical pluralism, noting the tensions 
among institutions at the international level (the WTO, Cartagena Biosafety Protocol, and Codex 
Alimentarius Commission), the European level (the European Food Safety Authority, European 
Commission, and Council of the European Union), and the EU member state level (which can 
resist both WTO and EU dictates). He shows how, on the one hand, the EU has accommodated 
the WTO’s general approval of risk-based analysis, but on the other hand, remains deeply 
resistant to approving GM varieties that pass through the risk assessment process, in particular 
because of the likely response of EU member states. The WTO panel decision took account of 
these tensions. Although the panel found against the EU, the decision was relatively open-ended, 
conducive to ongoing political negotiation and pluralist exchange (196).9 Krisch finds this result 
to be normatively desirable, reflecting the advantages of a pluralist approach over a 
constitutionalist one in accommodating a world of different collectives that normatively disagree. 
As he writes, “[l]eaving issues of principle and hierarchies undecided may allow space for 
                                                
7 Created by S.C. Res. 1904, 17 December 2009 available at http://www.un.org/ga/search/ 
view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1904%282009%29. 
8 M. Pollack & G. Shaffer, When Cooperation Fails: The International Law and Politics of Genetically Modified 
Foods (2009). 
9 For a detailed account, see Shaffer, ‘A Structural Approach to WTO Jurisprudence: Why Institutional Choice Lies 
at the Center of the GMO Case’, NYU J Int’l L & Pol (2008) 1-102. 
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pragmatic solutions on issues that are less fraught and might provide a safety valve when one or 
the other site of governance overreaches” (221).  
 
C. The Pluralist Advantage in Terms of Order, Power, Democracy, and the Rule of Law  
Part III builds from the case studies to assess the postnational pluralist vision in 
comparison with its constitutionalist foil. Krisch correctly notes that, as all alternatives, the 
pluralist vision is beset by tradeoffs, and he assesses these tradeoffs in comparison with those 
facing the constitutionalist vision. Chapter 7 first looks at the prospects of stabilizing cooperation 
and constructing transnational authority over time. Krisch finds that pluralism facilitates 
signaling to a decisionmaker, such as a WTO dispute settlement panel, that it may encounter 
significant resistance, so that such decisionmaker can tailor its decisions to accommodate 
difference. Pluralism can thus prevent backlash and broader challenges to the decisionmaker’s 
authority. Over time, such accommodation and bracketing of contested normative issues can be 
more responsive to change, and lead incrementally to more stable governance structures than a 
hierarchical, constitutional alternative.  
The chapter then looks at the problem of power, and how pluralism constrains power in 
comparison to a global constitutional alternative. Krisch challenges earlier scholars’ findings that 
the fragmentation of international law regimes favors powerful countries.10 He finds, in contrast, 
that, although fragmentation may give some initial advantages to powerful states, social actors 
can become more engaged over time, giving “initially excluded actors greater influence” (301). 
Citing the work of John Ikenberry,11 he notes that international institutional settlements aim to 
lock in particular power constellations which can become difficult to change because of veto 
powers. Thus, he contends, a pluralist structural framework better permits less powerful actors to 
construct countervailing norms and institutions to advance their perspectives.12  
In Chapter 8, Krisch assesses pluralism and global constitutionalism from the 
perspectives of democracy and the rule of law. Instituting democracy at the global level, as we 
commonly conceive it, is likely impossible. This challenge has thus spurred a considerable 
literature that reconceives democracy in deliberative, non-domination, and other terms.13 Since 
global governance structures are remote from individuals, they encounter greater distrust, 
potentially undercutting their effectiveness. Krisch finds that a pluralist structure for global 
governance facilitates contestation and flexible adaptation more than a constitutional alternative, 
so that international institutions become less threatening.14  
The value of contestation also lies at the center of Krisch’s response to critics of 
pluralism from a rule of law perspective.15 The rule of law, Krisch notes, is not just about 
certainty and predictability, but “also about rule” (282). Where international institutions are not 
                                                
10 See e.g. Benvenisti & Downs, ‘The Empire’s New Clothes: Political Economy and the Fragmentation of 
International Law’, Stanford L Rev (2007) 595. 
11 See G. J. Ikenberry, After victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars 
(2001). 
12 See e.g. Helfer, ‘Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics of Intellectual Property 
Lawmaking’,29:1 Yale J Int’l L (2004) 1. 
13 See e.g. J. Bohman, Democracy Across Borders: From Dêmos to Dêmoi (2010); D. Archibugi, The Global 
Commonwealth of Citizens: Toward Cosmopolitan Democracy (2008); de Burca, ‘Developing Democracy Beyond 
the State’, CJTL (2008) 101. 
14 The institutional facilitation of contestation and revisability are key criteria in contemporary democratic theory. 
See e.g. P. Petit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (1999); Petit, ‘Democracy, Electoral and 
Contestatory’, 42 NOMOS (2002) 105.; P. Rosanvallon, Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age of Distrust (2008). 
15 See e.g. Cruz, ‘The Legacy of the Maastricht-Urteil and the Pluralist Movement’, 14 ELJ (2008) 389-422 
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(and perhaps cannot) be grounded in democratic legitimacy, then a pluralist order is needed to 
contest who gets to define the rule in the rule of law.  
Krisch nonetheless recognizes the challenge of managing the interface of different 
pluralist orders in advancing the rule of law, and thus discusses the role of “interface norms” 
between different legal sub-orders. Here, he contends, enmeshed institutions within a pluralist 
structure should take each other into account (286), conditionally recognize each other’s 
decisions, as exemplified by the Solange judgment of the German federal constitutional court in 
response to the EU legal order (287), and engage in minimalist reasoning where there are 
frictions (291). Over time, he maintains, courts can take on “multiple identities,” suggesting that 
part of their identity might be a transnational one with each other, potentially leading to 
reconciliation “in the absence of ultimate conflict norms” which allocate jurisdictional authority 
(293). The amount of respect that one legal order shows toward another, he contends, should be 
conditional on the way the other balances self-determination and inclusiveness (295).  
 
2. Four Critiques 
 
Krisch advances a particular normative vision with which this reviewer in large part 
agrees. But in the spirit of pluralism, it behooves the reviewer both to accommodate Krisch’s 
vision and to contest it. Krisch is correct that a constitutional, hierarchical order seems contrary 
to the world we inhabit. Where there is conflict over different values, priorities, identities, and 
allegiances in the world, global hierarchical legal ordering also seems normatively undesirable.  
This essay nonetheless raises four critques. First, Krisch’s pluralist vision overlaps with 
those that he criticizes more than he admits, since these alternatives also highlight the value of 
both transnational cooperation and resistance based on legitimate difference. Second, Krisch’s 
critique of his constitutionalist foil could be much more radical than it is; rather, his analysis of 
postnational law parallels many constitutionalist approaches in being very court-centric. Third, 
Krisch’s postnational vision can also be viewed as too radical for the world outside of Europe in 
being grounded in a European “postnational” experience, as reflected in his three case studies in 
which Europe is central. A framework addressing transnational legal ordering in which states 
continue to play a central role may be a better one for addressing the world as a whole, in light of 
the ongoing centrality of the nation state in governance, including in the state’s own 
transformation through transnational processes. Finally, his framework fails to address variation 
in its normative evaluation of different institutional alternatives in which some centralization and 
hierarchy may be normatively preferable in some situations more than others, such as for the 
production of some global public goods. His vision is pluralist all the way through, where there 
are strong pragmatist arguments to be more context-specific in prescriptions. 
 
A. Similar in their Differences  
Krisch contends that [p]luralism occupies a middle ground between foundational 
constitutionalism and softer network forms of international cooperation (300). He writes: 
“pluralism helps steer a middle course between these positions—one that does not grant ultimate 
authority to any collective or process, but can help bring the competing visions into an informal 
balance” (183). Yet Krisch’s vision rings quite similarly to those of his foils—those on either 
side of what he claims to be the pluralist middle ground, sovereign-based intergovernmental 
networks, on the one hand, and many constitutionalists, on the other. Take, for example, this 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2175715
7 
 
quote from Anne-Marie Slaughter who claims that governance through intergovernmental 
networks constitutes “a new world order”:  
 
“the principle of legitimate difference should be adopted as a foundational 
premise of transgovernmental cooperation. All regulators participating in 
cooperative ventures of various kinds with their foreign counterparts should begin 
with the premise that ’difference’ per se reflects a desirable diversity of ideas 
about how to order an economy or society….. [A]t a global level, a principle of 
positive comity, combined with the principle of legitimate difference, creates the 
basis for a pluralist community of regulators who are actively seeking 
coordination at least and collaboration at best.”16  
 
Slaughter’s core claim of the centrality of governmental networks for governing a new world 
order is, as all universalist claims, bold in what it downplays and subsumes, such as the role of 
centralized international institutions and private non-governmental networks. The main foils in 
her book are the idea of global government (just as in Krisch’s) and the concept of governance 
through civil society networks. She, like Krisch, places here approach in the middle. Yet, when it 
comes to the defense of her normative perspective, she writes in very similar terms as Krisch. In 
fact, in some ways, the framework of a system of government networks, including enforcement 
and harmonization networks, provides more of a middle ground than does Krisch, since it is 
based on a form of “institutionalized cooperation” in global governance,17 while Krisch stresses a 
complete lack of institutionalization within a common framework in his pluralist vision.18  
Similarly, from the opposite pole, the most convincing scholars writing within a 
constitutionalist frame are not “foundationalists,” but rather constitutional pluralists, such as Neil 
Walker,19 Mattias Kumm,20 Miguel Poaires Maduro,21 Daniel Halberstam,22 and Alec Stone 
Sweet,23 who write in terms of a framework of common constitutional principles, functions, and 
                                                
16 A. M. Slaughter, A New World Order (2004), at 248, 253. 
17 Ibid., at 15, 19-22 (describing “world order” in terms of “a system of global governance that institutionalizes 
cooperation and sufficiently contains conflict”). 
18 Krisch writes affirmatively, “[t]his kind of pluralism does indeed ‘pose demands on reality’, yet the demands are 
not institutionalized in an overarching legal framework.” Krisch, supra note…, at 104. 
19 Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’, 65 Modern L Rev (2002) 317-272. 
20 See Kumm, ‘The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in and 
beyond the State’, in J. Dunoff & J. P. Trachtman (eds.) Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law 
and Global Governance (2009) 258, at 272 (“constitutional pluralism… is not monist and allows for the possibility 
of conflict not ultimately resolved by the law, but it insists that common constitutional principles provide a 
framework that allows for the constructive engagement of different sites of authority with one another”). 
21 See e.g. Maduro, ‘Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial Adjudication in the Context of Legal and 
Constitutional Pluralism’, in J. Dunoff & J. P. Trachtman (eds.) Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International 
Law and Global Governance (2009) 356, at 356 (“constitutional pluralism identifies the phenomenon of a plurality 
of constitutional sources of authority that create a context for potential constitutional conflicts between different 
constitutional orders to be solved in a nonhierarchical manner.”); Maduro, ‘Contrapunctual Law: Europe’s 
Constitutional Pluralism in Action’, in N. Walker (ed) Sovereignty in Transition (2003) 501. 
22  
23 Sweet, ‘A Cosmopolitan Legal Order: Constitutional Pluralism and Rights Adjudication in Europe’, Journal of 
Global Constitutionalism, at 2 (2012). Stone Sweet conceptualizes the European human rights regime as a 
“cosmopolitan legal order,” which he defines as “a transnational legal system in which all public officials bear the 
obligation to fulfill the fundamental rights of every person within their jurisdiction, without respect to nationality or 
citizenship.” Ibid., at 1. 
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other attributes. By labeling the constitutionalist vision as “foundational constitutionalism” based 
on hierarchy, Krisch attempts to win the argument by definition. Hierarchy, for most legal 
theorists, signifies that one entity has the final say. But as Stone Sweet illustrates, if one defines 
constitutionalism in these terms, then must find that France, Italy, and other European states are 
not constitutional orders since multiple courts claim authority.24 If one substitutes the term 
“constitutional pluralism,” as developed by the scholars just noted, for “foundational 
constitutionalism,” then we get a similar vision. For example, Neil Walker writes,  
 
“constitutional pluralism recognises that in the post-Westphalian world there 
exists a range of different constitutional sites and processes configured in a 
heterarchical rather than a hierarchical pattern, and seeks to develop a number of 
empirical indices and normative criteria which allow us to understand this 
emerging configuration and assess the legitimacy of its development.”25  
 
Just as Krisch refers to “postnational pluralism,” Walker refers to “postnational 
constitutionalism.”26 Once Krisch refers to the importance of developing “interface 
norms,” he moves toward a common framework for pluralist interaction advocated by 
constitutional pluralists, even though Krisch pulls back in saying that these interface 
norms are produced in the sub-orders and can themselves clash (312). 
From a sociolegal perspective, moreover, courts can formally respect the authority of a 
centralized international institution while interpreting its rules in a way that transforms them. 
Take, for example, the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Al Jedda v. the 
United Kingdom regarding the UK’s imprisonment of the petitioner in Iraq for over three years 
without charges.27 The court, in applying the European Convention of Human Rights, held:  
 
“[I]n interpreting its [the UNSC’s] resolutions, there must be a presumption that the 
Security Council does not intend to impose any obligation on Member States to 
breach fundamental principles of human rights. In the event of any ambiguity … the 
Court must choose the interpretation which is most in harmony with the requirements 
of the Convention and which avoids any conflict of obligations. In light of the United 
Nations’ important role in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights, it is 
to be expected that clear and explicit language would be used were the Security 
Council to intend States to take particular measures which would conflict with their 
obligations under international human rights law.”28 
 
Stone Sweet interprets this judgment as one of many which are emblematic of the rise of a 
“cosmopolitan legal order” involving the institutionalization of “complex forms of constitutional 
                                                
24 See Sweet, ‘Constitutionalism, Legal Pluralism and International Regimes,’ Indiana J of Global Legal Studies, 
16:2 (2010). I thank Alec Stone Sweet for this point. 
25 Walker, ‘The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism’, supra note…. As Walker writes elsewhere, “at least as the 
constitutional pluralist views the world, it becomes increasingly difficult if not impossible not to conceive of the 
environment of constitutionalism in non-unitary terms – as a place of heterarchically interlocking legal and political 
systems.” Walker, ‘Constitutionalism and Pluralism in Global Context’, in M. Avbelj and J. Komarek's 
Constitutional Pluralism in the European Union and Beyond (forthcoming 2012). 
26 Walker, Constitutionalism, supra note… 
27 Al-Jedda v. the United Kingdom, ECHR (2011) App. no. 27021/08.   
28 Ibid., at para. 102. 
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pluralism.”29 Indeed, in viewing the Kadi judgment, Krisch recognizes that judicial resistance 
can also occur in “constitutional settings” through a “reconciliation” approach pursuant to which 
a court interprets UNSC decisions in light of human rights obligations (179), just as the ECtHR 
did in Al Jedda, in the process potentially radically transforming, undercutting, or neutralizing 
them. In practice, the difference between legal pluralism and constitutional pluralism can be a 
difference in name only. They have more in common than they do in opposition.  
A significant reason that Krisch has much in common with most constitutional pluralists 
is that much of their life work is grounded in the experience of the European Union. Leading 
legal pluralists (such as Krisch and Mireille Delmas-Marty),30 and constitutional pluralists (such 
as Walker, Maduro, and Kumm,) are all European and write from within the European 
experience.31 Their visions are not so different, and they, in fact, often instantiate their visions 
through the same case studies, such as the interaction between the UNSC and the European 
Court of Justice in the Kadi decision.32 Indeed, Maduro was the Advocate-General in the Kadi 
case in which his opinion reflected his constitutional pluralist approach.33 In other words, both 
the foil and the vision can be viewed as European projections based on European experience. 
Similarly, and in contrast, those writing from the perspective of transgovernmental networks, 
focusing on decisionmaking by government officials, tend to be from the United States, such as 
Slaughter, Kal Raustiala, David Zaring, and this author, reflecting the political, sociological, and 
professional context in which they write.34 
 
B. A Tamed Critique of Global Constitutionalism  
Second, Krisch could go much further in his critique of the constitutionalist vision 
(including that of constitutional pluralism), but does not because he shares a similar professional 
vantage. A more introspective, critical examination of the constitutionalist vision would note that 
it is written largely by lawyers and not surprisingly suits lawyers because lawyers come out on 
top. We see a proliferation of constitutions today, what can be labeled an emerging “global 
constitutionalism” as part of a sweep of judicialization around the world.35 New constitutional 
courts have been granted powers to overrule decisions of the political process for the first time 
                                                
29 See discussion in Sweet, ‘A Cosmopolitan Legal Order’, supra note…, at… 
30 See e.g. M. Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Transnational 
Legal World (2008). 
31 This is not to say that non-Europeans having a close understanding of Europe do not write of the European 
experience in a constitutional pluralist vein. See e.g. Sweet, ‘A Cosmopolitan Legal Order’, supra note…; and  
Halberstam, ‘Constitutional Heterarchy: The Centrality of Conflict in the European Union and the United States’, in 
J. Dunoff & J. P. Trachtman (eds), Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law and Global Governance 
(2009) 326, at 328 (noting how comparison of constitutionalism in the US and EU “reveals that constitutionalism 
does not depend on traditional hierarchy among systems or interpretive institutions. Instead, constitutionalism can be 
realized within a system of heterarchy”). 
32 See e.g., Kumm, supra note…, at 286. See also Walker, ‘Beyond Boundary Disputes and Basic Grids: Mapping 
the Global Disorder of Normative Orders’, 6 Int'l J Const L 373, at 381 n.23 (2008). 
33 Advocate General M. P. Maduro in Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 Kadi et al. v. Council and 
Commission [2008] ECR I-6351.. 
34 See Slaughter, supra note ; M. Pollack & G. Shaffer, Transatlantic Governance in the Global Economy (2001); 
Raustiala, ‘The Architecture of International Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of 
International Law’ 43 Va J Int;l Law 1 (2002); Slaughter & Zaring, ‘Networking Goes International: An Update’, 2 
Ann Rev OF L & Soc Sci (2006) 211. 
35 See Sweet, ‘Constitutional Courts’, supra note…. See also Sweet & Mathews, ‘Proportionality Balancing and 
Global Constitutionalism’, 47 Colum J Transnat'l L (2008) 72; Hirschl, ‘The Judicialization of Politics’, in K. E. 
Whittington et al. (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Law and Politics (2008) 119, at 126-27. 
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around the world.36 Although sometimes disputed, these courts tend to maintain that they have 
the final say on constitutional interpretation which, given the open-ended terms that are often 
used, can have a broad sweep. This assertion of power is critiqued by some,37 but that is not the 
norm in legal academia.  
Krisch could have noted that, from, a political perspective, a constitutionalist approach 
gives greater power to law, legal institutions, and the legal profession, since in constitutional 
orders, law trumps over legislative politics, and judge-made law is central. A constitutional 
discourse conveniently gives more power to the primary interlocutors of legal academics. 
Politicians do not read us; business representatives don’t; but courts might. In addition, he could 
note that, within the legal academy itself, constitutions can be viewed as the pinnacle of the 
academic pecking order. In the United States, international law has not been taken seriously 
within mainstream law reviews, but viewed as a sub-branch of law relegated to specialized 
journals. The top law reviews in academic rankings, such as the Harvard Law Review, whose 
publication choices can determine a U.S. legal academic career, are more likely to publish an 
international law article if it uses a constitutional frame.  
Finally, from the critical sociological perspective of Pierre Bourdieu, law professors may 
speak in constitutionalist terms simply because that is their professional field, and they do not 
know better.38 Law professors tend to teach about courts and court decisions, especially higher 
court decisions such as those of the Supreme Court in the United States and its counterparts 
abroad. In contrast, economists tend to focus on markets and their attributes, political scientists 
tend to focus on legislatures and agencies, and sociologists on social groups, social movements, 
and social norms. These disciplines’ predilections for focusing on particular institutions, ones in 
which their particular forms of expertise tend to be validated and valued, is not necessarily self-
conscious. It is not that they are consciously instantiating a Nietzschian will to power through 
their disciplinary advantage, but their predilections can certainly be viewed in these terms, 
reflecting a competition between particular expertises.39  
                                                
36 T. Ginsburg & M. Versteeg, ‘The Global Spread of Constitutional Review: An Empirical Assessment’ 
(manuscript on file). 
37 See e.g. R. Hirschl, Towards Juristocracy: The Origins and Consequences of the New Constitutionalism (2004); J. 
Waldron, Law and Disagreement (1999). 
38 Bourdieu created field theory (in the French original, théorie des champs) which examines social subsystems 
involving patterned sets of practices which rely intrinsically on historically derived systems of shared meanings. 
These fields of expertise consist of taken for granted beliefs, or doxa, which define the field’s presuppositions. 
Bourdieu calls these field-specific sets of dispositions habitus. They define individual agency and make action 
intelligible. In Bourdieu’s words, a habitus involves “the forgetting of history that history itself produces.” P. 
Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Richard Nice trans.) (1990), at 56 (originally published in French in 1980 as Le 
Sens Pratique). See also Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field’ (Trans. Richard 
Terdiman ),38 Hastings L Rev (1987) 805, at 805-53 (1987); and  Guzzini, ‘A Reconstruction of Constructivism in 
International Relations, 6:2 EJIR (2000) 147, at 165-66 (applying Bourdieu to the study of international relations). 
The critical work of Michel Foucault could also be cited in a similar, more radical, critical vein. See e.g. Foucault, 
‘Nietzsche, Genealogy, History’, in P Rabinow (ed) The Foucault Reader (1986) 76; M. Foucault, Discipline and 
Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1977) (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (describing how 
knowledge systems produce an internalized disciplinary power); and S. Smith, ‘Positivism and Beyond’, in S. Smith 
et al (eds) International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (1996) 11, at 30 (Foucault’s “later work on genealogy 
sought to show how academic ‘discourses’ emerge “not as a neutral result of scholarly enquiry, but as the direct 
consequence of power relations. In short, power is implicated in all knowledge systems”).  
39 See e.g. Garth, and Dezalay, ‘Marketing and Selling Transnational “Judges” and Global ‘Experts”: Building the 
Credibility of (Quasi) Judicial Regulation’, 8:1 Socioecon Rev (2010) 113, at 123 (Transnational legal norms depend 
on “the international circulation of experts and knowledge between the North and the South.”); Y. Dezalay & B. 
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In short, Krisch could have been much more critical in his take on the constitutionalist 
framework than he was. Rather, like the constitutionalist vision, Krisch’s analysis is largely 
court-centric, as his case studies focus on the European Court of Human Rights, the European 
Court of Justice, and European national courts. Although he addresses the UN Security Council 
in his second case study, national legislatures, agencies, and transgovernmental networks are 
largely absent from his analysis, as are private business networks and transnational non-
governmental organizations. His court-centric focus is thus a rather narrow one. This focus is not 
fatal for his postnational vision, but it is radically incomplete. Any descriptive and normative 
analysis of legal norms ultimately should address the interplay of these institutions, particularly 
in light of the severe limits of courts in developing and applying law.40 
 
C. Not “Postnational”, but Trasnational Legal Ordering  
Third, descriptively, Krisch’s ‘postnational” vision is off the mark for much of the world. 
His three case studies all reference European court decisions which he knows best. Yet 
descriptively, it is doubtful whether most in the United States would view themselves in a 
“postnational” world. The same holds true for those in Brazil, China, and India, to cover about 
45% of the world’s population with four countries.41 If we are going to test claims regarding the 
pluralist structure of law in global context, we need case studies outside of the US and EU.42 
A different, and, in my view, more accurate term to describe legal ordering today is 
transnational ordering in which legal norms apply across borders and are conveyed through 
transnational legal processes.43 This conveyance of transnational legal norms can occur through 
courts, but more frequently it involves agency officials in transgovernmental networks, private 
economic actors, non-governmental activists, and legal and other professionals. When the legal 
norm becomes settled across jurisdictions, we could speak in terms of a transnational legal 
ordering, such as those concerning double taxation, tariff bindings, corporate bankruptcy, 
intellectual property, accountability for human rights violations, money laundering, and (indeed) 
                                                                                                                                                       
Garth. The Internationalization of Palace Wars: Lawyers, Economists, and the Contest to Transform Latin 
American States (2002); and Dezalay & Garth, ‘Introduction’, in Y Dezalay & B. Garth (eds), Global Prescriptions: 
The Production, Exportation and Importation of a New Legal Orthodoxy (2002) 1, at 5 (2002) (“impacts differ 
according to the countries, the expertises, and the 
positions of the importers and exporters”). 
40 See e.g. N. Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics and Public Policy (1994); 
N Komesar, Law’s Limits: The Rule of Law and the Supply and Demand of Rights (2001).  
41 Around half of the world’s population lives in China, India, the United States, Indonesia, and Brazil, in that order. 
See Cent. Intelligence Agency, The CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/xx.html (giving total world population and population for top ten most populous countries, last 
updated Jan.26, 2012). 
42 Cf. Shaffer, ‘Transnational Legal Process and State Change’, L & Soc Inquiry (2012) 1 , and the rest of the 
symposium issue of Law and Social Inquiry (with empirical studies of corporate bankruptcy law in China, Korea, 
and Indonesia; patent law and competition law in South Africa; anti-money laundering law in Brazil and Argentina; 
and primary education law and policy in over seventy low- and middle-income countries). 
43 See Shaffer, ‘Transnational Legal Process and State Change’, supra note…; T. Halliday & G. Shaffer, 
‘Transnational Legal Orders’ (manuscript on file). See also K. Abbott, ‘Strengthening International Regulation 
through Transnational New Governance’, 42 Vanderbilt J. of Int’l L. 501 (2009); K. Abbott and D. Snidal, ‘The 
Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State’, in The Politics of Global 
Regulation 44 (eds W Mattli & Ngaire Woods) (2009); G-P Calliess & P. Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and 
Running Code: A Theory of Transnational Private Law; and P. Zumbansen, Transnational Legal Pluralism, 
Transnational Legal Theory (2010)  
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constitutional judicial review, to name a few.44  
Much of the construction of global constitutional legal ordering is a combination of 
bottom-up and top-down processes involving modelling and diffusion of institutional forms, such 
as judicial review, and of constitutional norms, such as due process.45 Transnational legal 
processes are not captured in the global constitutionalist framework, which focuses on 
international institutions, nor Krisch’s pluralist framework, which focuses on the responses of 
supranational and national courts (and, to a limited, extent other institutions) to each other. More 
empirical work of these processes is needed to understand transnational legal ordering. 
Most importantly, states remain central to these transnational processes since most 
legitimate authority remains within the state. It thus seems misleading to use the term 
postnational to describe the current context, especially outside of Europe. In fact, in Krisch’s 
study, states are more central than in most studies of transnational legal ordering.46 Although 
Krisch notes, at the book’s start, the importance of “international institutions, multilateral 
companies and transnational non-governmental organizations” (at 5), his case studies are not 
only court-centric, but also state-centric, highlighting the role of state constitutional court 
responses (to the ECtHR over human rights), state regulatory responses (such as to genetically 
modified foods), and state resistance to the UN sanctions regime. In the latter case, although 
Krisch examines the role of the ECJ in the Kadi decision, he recalls that one explanation of the 
ECJ decision was its concern to uphold its human rights credentials and thus ward off scrutiny 
and challenges to its authority by national courts (172).47 
As Saskia Sassen’s work shows, from a transnational perspective, the state remains 
central as a political unit, and is thus critical for understanding its own transformation.48 The 
state contributes to its own change through its active collaboration with and enabling of 
transnational forces. Outside of the EU context, in particular, the efforts of international bodies 
to regulate are often subject to resistance within states. This resistance can neutralize, hybridize, 
appropriate, and transform international and transnational law in distinct and unanticipated ways, 
which can lead recursively to new international and transnational lawmaking.49 In this recursive 
interaction of the state and international and transnational institutions, the state remains central, 
                                                
44 See Halliday & Shaffer, ‘Transnational Legal Orders’, supra note…, building from nine case studies of different 
domains of human rights, business, and regulatory law). 
45 As Tom Ginsburg and Mila Veersteeg write, “[b]y our account, some 38% of all constitutional systems had 
constitutional review in 1951; by 2011, 72% of the world’s constitutions gave courts the power to supervise 
implementation of the constitution and set aside legislation for incompatibility….  Arguably, this trend is one of the 
most important phenomena in late 20th and early 21st century government.” Ginsburg & Veersteeg, supra note… 
46 Cf. Abott & Snidal, The Governance Triangle, supra note…; Calliess & Zumbansen, Rough Consensus and 
Running Code, supra note…; and Shaffer, ‘How Business Shapes Law: A Socio-Legal Framework’, 42 Connecticut 
L Rev (2009) 147, at 147-184 (2009). 
47 See also Krisch, supra note …, at 245 (“the ECJ’s strong stance against the Security Council may also be due to a 
dependence… on national constitutional courts which might otherwise have stepped in to defend due process 
rights”). 
48 See S. Sassen, Territory, Authority, Rights: From Medieval to Global Assemblages (2006), at 3 (“The national is 
still the realm where formalization and institutionalization have all reached their highest level of development,” but 
“the national is also often one of the key enablers and enactors of the emergent global scale”); S. Sassen, A 
Sociology of Globalization (2007), at 46, 56. Cf. S. Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization 
(1996), at xii (“globalization under these conditions has entailed a partial denationalizing of national territory and a 
partial shift of some components of state sovereignty to other institutions, from supranational entities to the global 
capital market”). 
49 T. Halliday & B. Carruthers, Bankrupt: Global Lawmaking and Systemic Financial Crises (2009); Shaffer, 
‘Transnational Legal Process’, supra note… 
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even where its institutions and laws are significantly affected in the process. What we are 
witnessing instead of postnational law are variable pressures and convergences that give rise to 
transnational legal ordering, with considerable variation within national contexts in light of 
different institutional and socio-cultural legacies and configurations of power.50 It is this varying, 
pluralist interaction of different national, international, and transnational legal orders, of different 
geographic and substantive scope, which is of growing importance for the empirical study of 
how law operates today. Krisch, in fact, uses the term transnational when he assesses the 
interaction of international security and human rights regimes, writing: “[h]ierarchies are here [in 
the global context] even more contested than in the regional [EU] context, and Europe’s internal 
pluralism… then becomes a piece in a broader transnational mosaic” (176). The legal ordering 
that we see is transnational because it implicates multiple states and constituencies within them, 
but it is not postnational in that states remain central to the creation, implementation, and 
contestation of transnational legal ordering. 
The advantage of the approach to transnational legal orders is that it is grounded in 
empirical socio-legal study, as opposed to a normative framework. It examines when settlement 
and alignment between institutions occurs, when it does not, and why. This approach is thus 
complementary to Krisch’s normative approach which explicitly calls for “more empirical work” 
and “deeper inquiries into the institutional dynamics of pluralist orders” in varying contexts (70).  
 
D. Pluralist Fundamentalism  
The positive study of transnational legal ordering also has important implications for 
developing a normative perspective because it opens up the assessment of institutional variation 
in light of tradeoffs. Krisch’s pluralist structural framework comes with a particular commitment 
to the value of contestation, while his constitutionalist foil comes with a greater commitment to 
the value of order.51 The positive, empirically-grounded study of transnational legal ordering, in 
contrast, is important for building a normative approach grounded in philosophical pragmatism 
which recognizes the need for institutional variation in response to different contexts. A central 
Jamesian/Deweyan pragmatist insight is that “only theory that works has established its truth; 
and that there is no way to divorce theory from fact.”52 Pragmatism comes in many varieties,53 
some of which are radically pluralist and thus resonate with Krisch’s approach in noting the 
importance of experimentation and revisability. Yet, in being attentive to factual context and the 
tradeoffs of institutional alternatives in responding to these contexts, pragmatism should remain 
open to the value of some institutional hierarchy in particular situations, as in producing some 
global public goods. In these situations, there is, of course, also need for ongoing 
                                                
50 Shaffer, ‘Transnational Legal Process’, supra note… 
51 Delmas-Marty’s work on pluralism, however, explores how pluralism can lead to order, including through 
“harmonisation by approximation,” and “unification by hybridization” involving the melding of different 
“ensembles” of law. See M. Delmas-Marty, Ordering Pluralism: A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the 
Transnational Legal World (2008). Krisch differentiates his perspective, noting, “Even Mireille Delmas-Marty, the 
most influential French theorist of transnational legal pluralism, tames her initially radical-sounding vision by an 
eventual attempt to create order through overarching rules, softened by way of margins of appreciation and 
balancing requirements. Just as the later [Neil] MacCormick, Delmas-Marty seems to become afraid of the ‘messy’ 
picture she describes and clings to some degree of institutionalized harmony.” Krisch, supra note …, at 75. 
52 Nourse and Shaffer, ‘Varieties of New Legal Realism’, …, at… The article also builds from “philosophical 
pragmatism’s premise that one cannot know one’s ends until one assesses means because one’s means open up new 
understandings of ends.” Ibid., at.. 
53 See e.g. L. Menand (ed), Pragmatism: A Reader (1997) (with readings from such diverse authors as Peirce, 
James, Dewey, Mead, Rorty and Posner). 
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experimentation and adaptability. But a core pragmatist message is that the value of hierarchy 
should be seen along a spectrum, not as an either-or proposition. 
Although Krisch acknowledges that each structural vision for global legal ordering that 
he discusses involves tradeoffs, he does not fully address the conditions under which there may 
be a greater (or lesser) need for institutions to act in a more (or less) hierarchical manner, or 
within a more (or less) common normative framework. In other words, from a comparative 
institutional analytic perspective,54 there are areas where international institutions and a common 
normative framework should play a greater role than in others. Take for example, genocide, or 
traffic in nuclear weapons, or climate stabilization. Krisch does not explicitly note the 
institutional choices that need to be made as part of a broader conceptualization of law’s place in 
global governance. It is pluralism all the way through with Krisch. In the world, however, there 
is, and should be, institutional variation whose analysis is pragmatically grounded. 
Krisch, in fact, recognizes the need for variation when he writes that pluralism “allows 
for hierarchies and possibilities of close integration the absence of which typically places limits 
on network forms of coordination. Pluralism oscillates between hierarchy and network” (240).55 
This statement shows much greater flexibility and allowance for hierarchy where institutionally 
preferable, despite its tradeoffs. But such statement is at odds with the message otherwise central 
in the book that pluralism differs from constitutionalism in that it has no center, and thus no 
hierarchy, as reflected in the very next page: “pluralism is characterized precisely by the absence 
of a legal and institutional framework to regulate disputes between sub-orders” (241). The need 
for decisionmaking under a common normative framework coordinated through a centralized 
institution arises, in particular, with some types of global public goods, such as aggregate efforts 
public goods.56 Aggregate efforts global public goods require the combined effort of states to 
produce a public good (such as climate stabilization, or ozone layer protection), while 
individually states each have an incentive to free ride on the effort of others. As a result, states 
face a collective action problem, and will not invest in the production of the good unless they are 
assured that other states will make and fulfil their commitments.57 Centralization has its 
drawbacks, but for the production of such global public goods, hierarchic, centralized institutions 
may be needed. Pluralism’s virtue is that it accounts better for divergences in value and the 
distributive consequences of international law, but its vice is in interfering with the production of 
some types of global public goods, exacerbated in situations requiring a timely response.  
In sum, from a comparative institutional analytic perspective, the four frameworks that 
Kirsch addresses in his book (the traditional dualist structure of international and national law; 
governance through transgovernmental networks; global constitutionalism; and pluralism) are 
not preferable invariably across all contexts. Rather, different institutional responses are more 
appropriate to different situations in light of the relative institutional advantages and 
                                                
54 See Komesar, Imperfect Alternatives, supra note… (foundational work on comparative institutional analysis in 
law); Shaffer & Trachtman, ‘Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the WTO’, 52:1 Virginia J Int’l L (2011) 103 
(applying comparative institutional analysis to WTO dispute settlement from a broader global governance 
perspective).. 
55 He also notes, “one would certainly not want all domestically entrenched interests to have a decisive impact on 
the global level; otherwise, cooperation would be seriously hampered” Krisch, supra note…, at 185.  
56 For a discussion of the relation of international law, legal pluralism, and different types of global public goods, 
see G. Shaffer, ‘International Law and Global Public Goods in a Legal Pluralist World’ (2012) (manuscript on file). 
57 S. Barrett, Why Cooperate? The Incentives to Supply Global Public Goods (2007). The assessment of the 
tradeoffs of a pluralist structure would benefit from cases studies focusing on global public goods such as climate 
stabilization and ozone layer protection. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2175715
15 
 
disadvantages offered. Comparative institutional analysis, grounded in socio-legal empirical 
study, eschews a commitment to a pluralist fundamentalism, as it does a commitment to any 
other universal vision (such as foundational constitutionalism). It rather recognizes the (relative) 





In Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law, Krisch shows 
how domestic and international law have become increasingly “blurred” on account of 
developments in “trans- and international cooperation,” such that “new conceptualizations are 
needed” (227). He is correct in his critique of the dominant dualist paradigm of international law 
for being radically insufficient for understanding today’s context and for responding to it. In the 
book, Krisch makes a powerful normative case for pluralism based on respect for individual 
autonomy in a world of diverse collectivities. His approach is more responsive than a 
hierarchical, global constitutionalist one to a world of states, with different demoi, whose actions 
affect each other, calling for coordinated, differentiated approaches to governance. He shows 
why more extreme strategies of containment (nationalism) and global constitutionalism 
(cosmopolitanism) are normatively problematic. He confronts the fact that the pluralist structural 
alternative involves tradeoffs, and concludes that, overall, it is better at stabilizing cooperation 
because of its incremental approach to normative settlement, and its flexibility and 
responsiveness to a changing world. He distrusts hard international law promulgated by 
centralized institutions that are holistic and unitary (based on a universal grundnorm, or rule of 
recognition), forming part of what he calls the “legalization project” (303). He rather advocates 
the ongoing importance of opening space for pluralist politics in response to distributive conflict, 
reflecting diverse values, priorities, and perspectives.  
Despite the appeal of his vision, it raises a number of concerns addressed in this review. 
From a socio-legal perspective, the normative frames that Krisch examines, while important in 
clarifying normative principles, can be applied to obtain similar outcomes. Constitutions, for 
example, (and especially in a constitutional pluralist setting) can be flexibly interpreted and are 
modified in practice through interpretation in response to social change in ways that are not 
captured by Krisch’s ideal type of “foundational constitutionalism.” As a result, Krisch’s 
pluralist perspective, in practice, blurs with both the constitutional one (in its constitutional 
pluralist variant) and the network governance one. Each of these normative frames attempts to 
address, in overlapping ways, the challenge of reconciling the need for transnational governance 
and the undesirability of global government. 
As traditionally domestic public issues become globalized, states and other actors will 
develop new institutions. What Krisch describes as the growing enmeshment of national and 
international law thus leads to the development of what can be called transnational legal orders. 
From a positive perspective, what we need today is further theorizing and empirical study that 
addresses variation in this legal ordering, and the reasons for it. From a normative perspective, 
we need contextual analysis as to the relative benefits of different institutional approaches in 
different contexts in light of the factors Krisch analyzes so well. 
Writing this essay in the region of Ladakh, in the federal state of Jammu-Kashmir, within 
one hundred miles of the Pakistani and Chinese borders, not far from the Siachin military 
hospital, and with thousands of solders on different sides of the infamous “Line of Control,” the 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2175715
16 
 
term “postnational” strikes me as peculiar, and perhaps “eutopian.” It does not resonate 
descriptively. And there are strong grounds to critique it normatively given that each side has 
nuclear weapons. Among the world’s greatest concerns is that one of them could become a 
“postnational” failed state, no longer monopolizing the use of force, including of nuclear 
warheads.  
Although transnational legal ordering must be subject to contestation, as in Krisch’s 
pluralist vision, the nation state remains central to it. We have yet to arrive at a postnational 
world. Although the term postnationalism goes too far, Krisch’s pluralist values of “taking into 
account,” mutual accommodation, conditional recognition, deliberation, and legitimate 
difference, will be critical for creating legal orders in transnational governance. As I write this 
essay on the border of India, Pakistan, and China, these values for legal ordering seem of 
existential importance. 
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